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Abstract 
 
This paper uses the impulse responses of a structural VECM to compare the effect of 
output shocks originating from the US and China on the Taiwanese economy. From 
1980 to 2011 the impact of a US output shock on Taiwan is seven times greater than 
one originating in China, yet from 2000 to 2011 the impact from either country is the 
same. Exposure to China has grown more rapidly than exposure to the US, reflecting 
the rapid growth in cross-strait trade intensity between China and Taiwan this century. 
Other East Asian economies that have booming trade with China are likely to exhibit 
similar results, questioning the common practice of using the US as a proxy for 
foreign effects in the region. We provide two examples motivating the need to 
include both US and Chinese foreign effects in modelling Taiwan; one based on the 
evolving economic openness of Taiwan and the second from the East Asia monetary 
union literature. 
 
Keywords:  China, VECM, Taiwan 
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1 Introduction 
The opening of China’s economy is a distinctive feature of our times. It marks the most rapid and 
sustained growth of any large economy in recorded history, outstripping both Europe during the 
Industrial Revolution and the United States in the 19th century. Since 1980 China’s growth has 
averaged 12.2 percent annually, with real GDP doubling every 7-8 years (IMF, 2014a). With China 
making up around a fifth of the world population, its emergence as a formidable economic player 
has caused large changes in the global economic order, with the world’s economic centre of gravity 
swinging 7,200km East since 1980 from the mid-Atlantic to Central Iran (Quah, 2011).  
China’s new economic weight has been driven by growing economic linkages with the rest 
of the world (ROW). The trade linkage has been particularly important, with China’s export boom 
causing its share of world trade to surge to 11.7 percent in 2013 (WTO, 2014). This large share of 
world trade has even lead to China having a non-negligible impact on commodity price fluctuations 
(see for example, Osborn & Vehbi, 2013). China’s rapid integration with the world economy carries 
with it an implication that fluctuations in the Chinese economy will now have significant spillovers 
to the rest of the world.  
These spillovers can be understood through examining the nature of its trade surge. China’s 
rise has been driven by its role as the world’s factory, operating within a regional production chain. 
Over half of the exports to China from regional neighbours are production inputs, such as 
semiconductors and hard drives, bound for final assembly (WTO, 2014). The destination for the 
majority of these cheap manufactures is the United States and Euro Area. Thus China hasn’t been 
so much an engine of demand, as a transmission belt for demand generated in developed markets. 
This is reflected in regional neighbours running trade surpluses with China, whilst most other trade 
partners tend to run trade deficits. Given that imports depress the growth spillover from exports, 
when trade is considered in isolation, China has likely had a small negative impact on growth in 
most developed economies, whilst its neighbours have likely felt strong trade borne growth 
spillovers. Arora & Vamvakidis (2011) confirm this hypothesis empirically, finding the effect of a 
Chinese growth spillover is quicker and larger for countries closer to China. 
A recent series of Structural VAR (SVAR) and global VAR (GVAR) studies have 
estimated the magnitude of the spillovers to others originating from a Chinese output shock. Despite 
the Asia region having greater exposure to China than to the ROW, the evidence unanimously 
estimates the effect on Asian domestic outputs from a Chinese output shock to be some three times 
smaller than that of a US output shock (Dungey & Vehbi, 2011; Sato et al., 2011; Utlaut & Van 
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Roye, 2010; Genberg, 2005; Abeysinghe and Forbes, 2005). Likewise, despite China’s 
extraordinary demand for minerals and primary products, Osborn & Vehbi (2013) find that the 
accumulated increase in Australia and New Zealand’s GDP from a one percent increase in output 
growth in China is only 0.2 to 0.4 percent. Feldkircher & Korhonen (2014) employing a GVAR to 
52 countries, note a similar trend globally, while Dungey, Fry-Mckibbin & Linehan (2014) note 
positive spillovers from demand for iron ore on Australian output, but also evidence for longer term 
Dutch disease due to reallocation of resources between domestic sectors. 
The small estimates of economic impact from China seems incongruous with regional trade 
statistics that show huge trade surpluses, large bilateral investment, and the fact these regional 
neighbours are almost all small trade-reliant economies. Moreover, the IMF (2014b) find that 
during the global financial crisis, China’s expansion provided a buffer for emerging market growth, 
whilst China’s recent slowdown has reduced growth in these economies. 
 There have been divergent economic explanations for this result, including the role of the 
US as a final source of demand (Pula & Peltonen, 2011; Dungey & Vehbi, 2011); the majority of 
international trade contracts being priced in US dollars (Dungey & Vehbi, 2011); regional trade 
competition (Feldkircher & Korhonen, 2014) and the dominance of financial effects in shock 
transmission (Arora & Vamvakidis, 2011; Bayoumi & Swiston, 2009). Other authors do not provide 
an explanation, but rather just report their estimates (e.g. Utlaut & Van Roye, 2010; Osborn & 
Vehbi, 2013; Sato et al., 2011). Gosse and Guillaumin (2013) implement SVARs with exogenous 
influences from the world economy represented by US financial data, but no output effect. Lastly, 
some papers point out the possible limitation of using static parameter models such as SVARs when 
modeling data that contains parameter drift (aka China’s growing share of world trade since 1978) 
(e.g. Cesa et al., 2011; Osborn & Vehbi, 2013; Arora & Vamvakidis, 2011). Accordingly, Dungey 
& Vehbi (2011) confine conclusions from their SVAR estimates to how best to model foreign 
effects in Asia, whilst Osborn & Vehbi (2013) and Arora & Vamvakidis (2011) focus on the 
general increase and  nature of China’s rise, rather than its exact level. 
One aim of this paper is to show that conclusions of China’s small effect are a by-product 
of its sudden rise; and previous fixed parameter SVAR studies have underestimated China’s effect 
on Asia and the world. This is not a new point (see for example, Arora & Vamvakidis, 2011 p.39, 
Abeysinghe and Forbes, 2005), however, many papers continue to emerge that merely report that 
employing static parameter SVARs are a possible limitation, or report results as though they capture 
China’s current effect on the world (e.g. Utlaut & Van Roye, 2010; Feldkircher & Korhonen, 2014); 
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this confusion is made explicit when The Economist (2010) cite Arora & Vamvakidis (2011)’s 
VAR estimate as a measure of the current size of a China growth spillover on ROW2. 
Figure 1 graphs the value of exports from selected Asian economies to China equalized 
around unity. Asian economies have all experienced a boom in exports to China since 2000, with 
export value on average increasing ten-fold. If trade links translate fairly monotonically to 
economic exposure, this figure implies China’s impact on Asia has been increasing rapidly, 
suggesting that the exposure to China at the end of the sample will be much larger than the average; 
Abeysinghe and Forbes (2005) dispute the direct relationship of trade to interlinkages although their 
sample is now somewhat dated (1978-1998), but Kim and Lee (2012) contribute evidence of 
growing economic integration in the region. To examine the degree to which sample choice effects 
SVAR estimates, we make an application to Taiwan, the economy where trade integration has been 
most deep and rapid. 
 
Figure 1: Total Exports with China: Selected Asian Economies (2000=1) 
The second component of this paper focuses explicitly on the extensive economic 
integration occurring between China and Taiwan, which has recently grown to a level unrivalled by 
other Asian economies, as shown in Figure 1. Taiwan is highly exposed to the world economy in 
general, experiencing the largest and sharpest drop in exports within Asia during the global 
                                                            
2The Economist. ‘The Indispensable Economy’. 2010. http://www.economist.com/node/17363625. 
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financial crisis (ADB, 2009). Such characteristics stem from Taiwan’s export-led growth within the 
volatile IT and electronics sectors, within which China plays a key role. In 1985, facing fierce price 
competition from regional competitors, such as South Korea, Taiwan began offshoring 
manufacturing to China, where wages were substantially lower. Since then, cross-strait trade growth 
has been a function of the pace of liberalization of trade, facilitated by cost-cutting Taiwanese 
SME’s. Thus Taiwan and China’s trade reflects a production network, with 70 percent of exports to 
China being unfinished goods bound for final assembly (Yuan-Tung, 2004). Of these exports 75 
percent are by firms with manufacturing in China, and almost exclusively in electronics and IT 
goods bound for developed markets (Su, 2011). This regional supply chain, augmented by 
geographical proximity, a common language, and diplomatic isolation internationally has led to 
economic integration unmatched by other economies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 shows the acceleration of cross-strait trade since 2000 associated with 
liberalization measures which include; joining the WTO in 2001, signing the Open Door policy in 
2008 and the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) in 2010. By 2011 Chinese 
exports were 34.5 percent of Taiwanese GDP, compared with 10.2 percent and 1.9 percent for Asia 
and ROW. Taiwan’s total exports to China in 2011 amounted to US$160 billion, the third largest 
Source: MAC, 2012
Figure 2: China’s Share of Total Trade with Taiwan (%) 
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after Japan and Korea, and net exports with China are the world’s largest at $US89 billion, making 
up 19 percent of Taiwan’s GDP, compared to 11.5 percent for the rest of Asia3. 
Given the increasing structural similarities of East Asia economies since the financial crisis 
of 1997-98, a number of studies model this region as though it were a country, or as though 
conclusions about a subsample apply to the general region (For example, Nguyen et al., 2014; 
Utlaut & Van Roye, 2010). Taiwan’s unique trade integration with China relative to other Asian 
economies suggests that if trade is an important transmission mechanism, this assumption is not 
valid in relation to China-borne shocks, where Taiwan’s reaction is likely much stronger. To date, 
only Sato et al. (2011) and Abeysinghe and Forbes (2005) assess China’s direct impact on Taiwan. 
Their samples are respectively from 1999 to 2006 and 1978 to 1998 and thus omit the most recent 
effects of trade intensification4.The additional time span available provide an opportunity to revisit 
the issue. 
The analysis deals with two main issues, relating to the validity of using the US as a proxy 
for foreign effects. This a common assumption in open economy SVAR literature introduced by 
Cushman & Zha (1997). To assess its validity Dungey & Vehbi (2011) compare the impact of 
similar sized output shocks from China and the US for five East Asian economies over the period 
1986 to 2009, concluding that more explanatory power is gained by using the US as a proxy for 
global conditions, but that in future China is likely to be an important external influence. This paper 
will assess whether a new definition of foreign effects is already needed for Taiwan, using a similar 
analytical framework applied to the Taiwanese economy. To illustrate the importance of these 
choices we examine two cases where the correct representation of foreign effects is likely to be 
important. The first examines Taiwan’s rapid opening to global trade and financial markets, 
focusing on the role of the Asian financial crisis in this process5, and assesses if using the US as 
foreign proxy will yield adequate results in such a context.  
                                                            
3Aggregate trade data and GDP cited in the paper are from the National Bureau of Statistics of China and The 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators, 2011. ‘Asia’ is defined as Malaysia, Korea, Singapore, 
Thailand, Vietnam, Philippines, Indonesia and Japan. The ‘ROW’ measure is the sample used in the GVAR 
of Feldkircher & Korhonen (2014) less Asia. 
4 Cross-strait trade in 2006 was only .65 of its 2011 level (MAC, 2012). 
5Zhang et al. (2004) find that the Asian financial crisis initiated a rise in the openness of East Asian 
economies. However, this seems unlikely for Taiwan for a number of reasons, chiefly that its currency was 
floating (see Yan & Yang, 2012).  
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The second case examines the existing SVAR literature regarding monetary union in East 
Asia6. The literature emerged following the AFC and reported increasing similarities in responses to 
common external shocks by Asian economies, and the declining importance of country specific 
shocks, and led directly to more recent analysis supporting monetary union amongst certain regional 
sub-groups (Huang & Guo, 2006; Liu, 2012; Nguyen et al., 2014). However, the symmetry of 
response to Chinese shocks has not been thoroughly assessed in these studies, but instead uses the 
US to model foreign effects. Given that China’s economic impact is potentially quite large and 
growing we argue that a more thorough analysis regarding response to China sourced shocks is 
crucial to assessing the potential for monetary union in East Asia. For example, Nguyen et al. (2014) 
and Liu (2012) that recommend Taiwan join a North East Asian monetary union on the basis of 
empirical work concerning a US output shock. If the effect of a Chinese output shock on Taiwan is 
disproportionately large, there has been a loss of generality from using the US to model foreign 
effects, and  Taiwan is likely not in a position to join such a monetary union.  
Taiwan has a number of attractive features for this analysis. Firstly, Taiwan is a harbinger 
of a broader trend of East Asian trade integration with China (see Figure 1). Secondly, Taiwan has 
many of the features of a modern developed economy; inflation targeting, floating exchange rates 
and minimal disturbance from the 1997-98 financial crisis. Finally, China’s impact on Taiwan can 
be given a distinct trade interpretation, given that protectionism blocked cross-strait financial 
linkages until 20097; thus allowing an analysis of the importance of the trade channel for Taiwan, 
and by extension its similarly export-reliant neighbours (see Appendix D). 
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the theoretical model, Section 3 and 4 
describe the economic specification of the SVECM and estimation procedures, Section 5 presents 
the empirical results and Section 6 makes some concluding remarks. 
 
 
                                                            
6 An abundance of SVAR literature exists on this topic; all assessing whether the commonality of response to 
external shocks has become more symmetric over time, which would tick off one of the preconditions for an 
optimal currency area. See Chow & Kim, 2003; Zhang et al., 2004; Huang & Guo, 2006; Hsu, 2010; Nguyen 
et al., 2014, Liu, 2013; Quah, 2012 etc. 
7The absence of financial linkages is backed up empirically, with no stock market correlations or covariability 
in interest rates found between Taiwan and China (Cheng & Glascock, 2005; Cheung et al, 2005; Bahng & 
Shin, 2004). 
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2 Theoretical Framework 
The New Keynesian DSGE framework developed in Gali & Monacelli (2005) is adopted to inform 
the identifying restrictions made in the empirical specification. The model consists of an open 
economy IS curve, a Phillips curve, exchange rate equation and Taylor rule. The model structure 
takes the form: 
 ݕ௧ ൌ µܧ௧ݕ௧ାଵ ൅ ሺ1 െ µሻݕ௧ିଵ െ ∅ሺݎ௧ିଵ െ ܧ௧ିଵߨ௧ሻ ൅ ߠଵ∆ݍ௧ ൅ ߠଶݕ௧∗ ൅ є஺஽௧ 
 (1) 
  ߨ௧ ൌ ߜܧ௧ߨ௧ାଵ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߜሻߨ௧ିଵ ൅ ߣݕ௧ ൅ ߠଷ∆ݍ௧ ൅ є஺ௌ௧   
 (2) 
        ݎ௧ ൌ ߩݎ௧ିଵ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߩሻሺߚܧ௧ߨ௧ାଵ ൅ ߛݕ௧ሻ ൅ єெ௉௧   
 (3) 
                              ܧ௧∆ݍ௧ାଵ ൌ ሺݎ௧ െ ܧ௧ߨ௧ାଵሻ െ ሺݎ௧∗ െ ܧ௧ߨ௧ାଵ∗ ሻ െ єோாோ௧   
 (4)	
Where ݕ௧ and ݕ௧∗ are the log of domestic and foreign output gaps, ݎ௧ and ߨ௧ are the nominal interest 
rate and domestic inflation rate respectively, and ݍ௧ is the real exchange rate. є஺஽௧, є஺ௌ௧, єெ௉௧ and 
єோாோ௧ represent aggregate demand, aggregate supply, monetary policy and real exchange rate 
shocks. The predictions from the NK DSGE model are used as theoretical justification for the sign 
restrictions imposed on the specification outlined in the next section. 
3 Empirical Specification 
Suppose that the economy is described by the following VARሺ݌ሻ: 
                                                  ݕ௧ ൌ ܣଵݕ௧ିଵ ൅ ⋯൅ ܣ௣ݕ௧ି௣ ൅ ݑ௧ (5) 
where ݕ௧ is a ሺ݊ݔ1ሻ vector of all endogenous variables, ܣ௜ is a ሺ݊ݔ݊ሻ matrix of parameters for ݅ ൌ
1,2, … , ݌, and ݑ௧ is a ሺ݊ݔ1ሻ vector of residuals with ݑ௧~ܰሺ0, ߑ௨ሻ. If all variables are difference 
stationary the VARሺ݌ሻ can be written in VECM form as: 
 ܤ଴߂ݕ௧ ൌ ߎ∗ݕ௧ିଵ ൅ ߁ଵ∗߂ݕ௧ିଵ ൅ ⋯൅ ߁௣ିଵ∗ ߂ݕ௧ି௣ାଵ ൅ ߝ௧ (6) 
where ߎ∗ is the structural matrix and the ߁௜∗, ݅ ൌ 1…݌ െ 1 are ሺ݊ݔ݊ሻ matrices of the short-run 
dynamics parameters. ߝ௧ is an ሺ݊ݔ1ሻ structural disturbance with zero mean and covariance matrix 
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ߑఌ and ܤ଴ is an ሺ݊ݔ݊ሻ matrix of the contemporaneous relations in ݕ௧. Assuming that the ܤ଴ matrix 
is invertible, Equation 6 is given by 
                                      ߂ݕ௧ ൌ ߎݕ௧ିଵ ൅ ߁ଵ߂ݕ௧ିଵ ൅ ⋯൅ ߁௣ିଵ߂ݕ௧ି௣ାଵ ൅ ݑ௧ (7) 
where ܤ଴ି ଵߎ∗ ൌ ߎ, ܤ଴ି ଵ߁௝∗ ൌ ߁௝ for ݆ ൌ 1,2,… ݌ െ 1 and ܤ଴ି ଵߝ௧ ൌ ݑ௧. When ߎ	has a reduced rank 
of ݎ ൑ ݊ െ 1 then ߎ can be written as ߎ ൌ ߙߚᇱ, where ߚ is a ሺ݊ݔݎሻ matrix of long-run relationships 
and ߙ is a ሺ݊ݔݎሻ matrix of the ‘speed of adjustment’ coefficients. The model is identified by 
combining exclusion restrictions on ܤ଴ and ߁௝as well as utilizing cointegration amongst the I(1) 
variables to provide extra identifying restrictions8.  
Equation 7 can be written with a Beveridge-Nelson Moving Average (MA) representation 
                                  ݕ௧ ൌ ܨ ∑ ݑ௜௧௧௜ୀଵ ൅ ∑ ܨ௝∗∞௝ୀ଴ ݑ௧ି௝ ൅ ݕ଴∗    (8) 
where ݕ଴∗ is the initial value of the series and the matrix ܨ ൌ ߚ┴ሺܽ┴′ ሺܫ௡ െ ∑ ߁௜௣ିଵ௜ୀଵ ሻߚ┴ሻିଵܽ┴′ . With ݎ 
cointegrating vectors, ܨ is of rank ݊ െ ݎ  and there are ݊ െ ݎ independent common trends. The first 
term in Equation 8 represents the long run effects of shocks which captures the common stochastic 
trends. The second term represents the transitory shocks to the system, such that ܨ௝∗ → 0	as݆ →
∞ .The common driving stochastic trends are the variables ܽ┴ᇱ ∑ ݑ௜௧௧௜ୀଵ where ߚ┴ሺܽ┴′ ሺܫ௡ െ
∑ ߁௜௣ିଵ௜ୀଵ ሻିଵ are their factor loadings. Replacing the ݑ௧ by their structural counterparts we obtain 
          ݕ௧ ൌ ݕ଴∗ ൅ ܨ ∑ ܤ଴ି ଵߝ௧௧௜ୀଵ ൅ ∑ ܨ௝∗∞௝ୀ଴ ܤ଴ି ଵߝ௧ି௝    (9) 
This allows recovery of transitory and permanent shocks. The permanent effects are captured 
through ܨܤ଴ି ଵ, which has a rank ݊ െ ݎ with ܤ଴ nonsingular. Thus, while ݎ of the structural shocks 
have transitory effects, ݊ െ ݎ will have a permanent effect and can be restricted to zero, freeing 
ݎሺ݊ െ ݎሻ independent identifying restrictions. 
 Using a Wold decomposition and assuming the first ݊ െ ݎ shocks are permanent ሺߝଵ௧ሻ we 
can write ∆ݕ௧ as 
               ∆ݕ௧ ൌ ܥሺܮሻܤ଴ି ଵ ቀߝଵ௧ߝଶ௧ቁ               (10) 
                                                            
8For details see Pagan & Pesaran (2008). 
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Where ܥሺܮሻ is a polynomial of order ݍ in the lag operator.  
For the remaining ߝଶ௧ shocks to be transitory requires 
                              ܨܤ଴ି ଵ ൬0ሺ௡ି௥ሻ∗௥ܫ௥ା௞ ൰ ൌ ܨߙ ൌ 0              (11) 
Which implies that ߙଵ ൌ 0, where ߙଵ is the ሺ݊ െ ݎሻ ∗ ݎ matrix of adjustment coefficients of the I (1) 
variables that give rise to the permanent shocks driving the cointegrating relationships. This 
suggests that structural equations for which there are known permanent shocks should have no error 
correction terms in them (see Pagan & Pesaran, 2008). 
Lastly, the conventional use of output gap (i.e Gali, 1992) is replaced by the differenced output 
together with the corresponding error correction term for this variable, in order to avoid 
misspecification (see Dungey & Pagan, 2009 for details). 
4 Estimation Procedure 
There are 5 variables included in the vector ݕ௧; foreign and domestic outputs, inflation, interest rates 
and the real exchange rate, aligning with standard open economy NK DSGE models. Exogenous oil 
price inflation is added to the Phillips Curve to help solve any potential price puzzle (see Kim & 
Roubini, 2000). Quarterly data is used from the inception of cross-strait trade in 1980Q3 up until 
2011Q4, allowing analysis of more recent cross-strait trade intensification. Appendices A and B 
contain the data description and variable plots.  
 Table 1 presents the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) results for all system variables. The 
ADF test shows that π୲ is stationary whilst ݕ௧∗, ݕ௧ and ݍ௧ are I(1) variables. As is common, the 
interest rate fails to reject the null of non-stationarity, but is assumed to be I(0); see Clarida et al., 
2000. 
 A trade interpretation of business cycles gives support to cointegration amongst foreign and 
domestic output and the exchange rate (see Mills & Pentecost, 2003). The Johannsen test confirms 
the existence of this long run relationship (see Table 2), which is estimated with the Engle-Granger 
two step procedure using alternatively Chinese or US output for foreign output: 
ܥ݄݅݊݁ݏ݁	ܩܦܲ	ܽݏ	ݕ௧∗:	ݕ௧ ൌ 	െ3.71 ൅ .66ݕ௧∗ ൅ .83ݍ௧ ൅ ݁௬௧ (12) 
   ܷܵ	ܩܦܲ	ܽݏ	ݕ௧∗:	ݕ௧ ൌ 	െ1.98 ൅ 2.07ݕ௧∗ ൅ .40ݍ௧ ൅ ݁௬௧ (13) 
The ADF statistics for tests of nonstationarity on the residuals, ݁௬௧, from the China and US 
equations are -3.46 and -2.25 respectively, with an associated MacKinnon (1996) 5 percent critical 
10 
 
value of -1.94, thus confirming cointegration in both equations. The Akaike Information Criteria 
(AIC) and Hannan-Quinn (HQ) point toward two lags, which is chosen in favour of 1 lag suggested 
by the Schwartz Criterion (SC); as supported by the results of a Likelihood Ratio Test, see Table 39.  
4.1  Exclusion Restrictions 
The contemporaneous exclusion restrictions are shown explicitly in Equation 14 and reflect a small 
open economy. Foreign output is most exogenous, and the real exchange rate least exogenous. 
Between those, domestic output is followed by domestic inflation and the monetary reaction 
function. The lag matrices in Equation 15 have a similar structure, but with additional dynamics that 
can be traced back to the lag structures in Equations 1-4. 
ܤ଴ݑ௧ ൌ
ۏێ
ێێ
ێۍ
1 0 0 0 0
ܾଶଵ଴ 1 0 0 0
0 ܾଷଶ଴ 1 0 0
0 ܾସଶ଴ ܾସଷ଴ 1 0
ܾହଵ଴ ܾହଶ଴ ܾହଷ଴ ܾହସ଴ 1ے
ۑۑ
ۑۑ
ې
ۏ
ێێ
ێ
ۍݑ௬೟
∗
ݑ௬೟ݑగ೟ݑ௥೟ݑ௤೟ ے
ۑۑ
ۑ
ې
ൌ
ۏ
ێێ
ێ
ۍߝ௬೟
∗
ߝ௬೟ߝగ೟ߝ௥೟ߝ௤೟ ے
ۑۑ
ۑ
ې
ሺ14ሻ	ܤ௅ሺܮሻ ൌ
ۏ
ێ
ێ
ێ
ێ
ۍܾଵଵ௟ 0 0 0 0ܾଶଵ௟ ܾଶଶ௟ ܾଶଷ௟ ܾଶସ௟ ܾଶହ௟
0 ܾଷଶ௟ ܾଷଷ௟ 0 ܾଷହ௟
0 ܾସଶ௟ ܾସଷ௟ ܾସସ௟ 0
ܾହଵ௟ ܾହଶ௟ ܾହଷ௟ ܾହସ௟ ܾହହ௟ ے
ۑ
ۑ
ۑ
ۑ
ې
ሺ15ሻ 
The identification of the temporary and permanent shocks involves estimating the long-run impact 
matrix, J; which estimates shock values as ݆ → ∞. A pre-cursor to this estimation is to specify the 
speed of adjustment matrix, ܽ and cointegrating vector, ߚ: 
ߙ ൌ
ۏ
ێێ
ێ
ۍ 0 0 00 0 0
0 ܽଷଶ 0
0 ܽସଶ ܽସଷܽହଵ ܽହଶ ܽହଷے
ۑۑ
ۑ
ې
ሺ16ሻ				ߚ ൌ
ۏ
ێێ
ێ
ۍߚଵଵ 0 01 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
ߚହଵ 0 0ے
ۑۑ
ۑ
ې
ሺ17ሻ 
The two I(0) variables contain pseudo-ECM terms, which are the coefficients of unity in columns 2 
and 3 of ߚ (see Dungey and Pagan, 2009). These terms correct for the levels effect that is lost when 
using a VECM.  
 Given the specification of the ܽ and ߚ matrices the structural form ߙ∗ is found via ܤ଴ି ଵܽ. 
These matrices are converted into their orthogonal complements, and the long run impact matrix is 
found through Equation 16: 
                                                            
9The LR statistics for China and the US are 71.6 and 56.44 respectively, against a critical value of 37.65, thus 
rejecting the null of the VAR(1) in first differences which was suggested by SC. 
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              (18) 
The J matrix is of reduced rank given there are ݊ െ ݎ long run trends. Thus ߝగ೟ , ߝ௥೟  and ߝ௤೟ are 
transitory shocks. The first two columns show that foreign and domestic output shocks have a 
permanent effect on ݕ௧∗, ݕ௧ and ݍ௧, with the block exogeneity condition precluding ݕ௧’s effect on ݕ௧∗. 
5 Results 
We report the impulse responses from the SVECM model applied to Taiwan for samples between 
1980 and 2011. Although a full set of impulses were produced, we report only the foreign variable 
sourced shocks here (however, the domestic economy shocks all produce reasonable results without 
evidence of price puzzle or exchange rate puzzle). Our analysis concentrates on foreign shocks 
emanating from China and the US. We first examine how the SVECM model results are affected by 
sequentially shorter and more recent sample lengths with either China or US as the source of 
foreign shocks. Our preferred specifications are used to assess the implications of China’s growth 
on SVAR modeling in the East Asia region. Finally we consider our two applications around the 
Taiwanese economy to demonstrate the importance of accounting for China in the modeling of 
foreign effects. 
The impulses are in response to one standard deviation shocks to the errors over a time span 
of 50 quarters (12.5yrs) with all calculations performed in MatLab. Shorter samples are estimated 
using the full sample error correction specification representing the long-run relationship. Appendix 
C shows that short-run deviations can take a long time to return to the long-run relationship; a short-
sample error correction specification is likely to lose precision. 
5.1 Effect of Sample Choice on SVAR estimates 
 Without reliable point estimates of China’s current impact it is difficult to determine 
whether trade is a weak transmission mechanism or if SVARs tend to underestimate China’s impact 
on East Asia and ROW. Unfortunately, little light is shed on this question by using very short-
sample SVAR’s, as they are imprecise, and time varying parameter models are difficult to 
implement in such a setting. We address this matter by utilizing SVECM estimates over 
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sequentially shorter more recent samples, to give an illustration of the evolving nature of exposure 
to China and the US. 
Figure 3 shows Taiwan’s output response to Chinese and US shocks. Each line on the 
figure represents the response in Taiwanese output to the same sized output shock originating from 
the US (in the left side panel) and from China (in the right side panel). The five lines on each panel 
represent the impulses resulting from estimates over different sample periods, starting from 1980 
when cross-strait links were initiated and then sequentially omitting the earliest five years from 
subsequent samples.  
Figure 3 illustrates the speed at which Taiwan’s exposure to both economies has risen over 
time. This is particularly the case for shocks originating from China (right hand panel). Omitting the 
years 1980 to 1985 more than doubles the output rise caused by a positive Chinese output shock; 
the earliest five years have almost non-existent cross-strait trade. After 1985, the trade growth has 
consistently increased with the lifting of cross-strait trade restrictions, as seen in Figure 3; the gap at 
each five year interval grows consistently larger through time. The largest increase in the gap occurs 
when omitting the years 1995 to 2000, representing the particularly intensive trade that has taken 
place since 2000 (see Figure 2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Output Responses to US and China Output Shocks 
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A similar, albeit more muted pattern of exposure exists for US shocks. Omitting the first five years 
increases exposure slightly; possibly due to the investment restrictions in place at the time. 
Removing the next five years has little effect due to the prominence of domestic factors (see Chang 
et al., 2002). Exposure then increases more rapidly, in alignment with renewed financial integration 
with the US and deepened bilateral cooperation and trade with US technology markets. 
 This increased exposure to foreign output shocks seems to fit quite closely with the nature 
and intensity of Taiwan’s economic linkages with the US and China. As economic linkages deepen 
between the economies, the estimated impact of a shock increases. Moreover, since the economic 
influence of China on Taiwan has been increasing much faster than the US influence, historical 
samples will tend to overstate the influence of the US relative to China. For example, the 1980-2011 
sample indicates a US shock will have an effect seven times larger than one from China, whilst a 
2000-2011 sample estimates the exposure as approximately equivalent (Abeysinghe and Forbes 
(2005), estimate the effect of a US output shock on Taiwan as having over 4 times more impact 
than a Chinese output shock for the period 1978-1998.) Given cross-strait integration has been 
almost exclusively through trade, the results provide strong evidence of the importance of the trade 
channel to Taiwan. As other East Asian countries are similarly susceptible to trade conditions, and 
have experienced rapid trade integration with China, similar conclusions are likely to apply to these 
economies. As a result, existing statements concerning the predominance of US shocks in East Asia 
are likely to be overstated using this type of framework. In fact both economies now have a large 
influence on macroeconomic outcomes. The evidence supports the practice of limiting SVAR 
conclusions to the general increase and nature of China’s rise, rather than its exact level. 
The dynamic approach used in Figure 3, however, does allows broad statements to be made 
about the current impact of a Chinese output shock. Transmission of Chinese shocks to Taiwan is 
exclusively through trade, and Figure 3 shows that the magnitude of these shocks reflects the nature 
of cross-strait trade. Given that from 1980 to 2000 trade flows grew from zero to $US32bn, yet by 
2011 had grown to $US160bn, one can posit that the exponential growth of cross-strait trade since 
2000 has caused a similarly unprecedented jump in the impact of a Chinese output shock to Taiwan 
in the present. The analysis implies Taiwan’s exposure to China is now significantly larger than its 
exposure to the US. 
5.2 The Empirical Adequacy of Using US as Foreign Proxy 
The empirical evidence for Taiwan suggests the Chinese economy is now more influential than the 
US economy. Thus, the exclusion of China in the modeling of foreign effects, at least in recent 
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years, will give misleading results. We explore this notion by using SVAR analysis to examine a 
historic issue and a policy issue that both require a good representation of foreign effects. The 
historic issue is an examination of the path of Taiwan’s rapid transition to becoming one of the most 
open economies in the region. The policy related issue is to add to the evidence regarding whether 
Taiwan is well positioned to enter an East Asia currency union. 
5.2.1 Application 1: Taiwan’s Evolving Openness 
The path of Taiwan’s evolving openness to global conditions is yet to be thoroughly examined. It is 
of interest because Taiwan was minimally impacted by the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997-8, yet 
experienced the largest impact of any East Asian economy from the global financial crisis in 2008. 
We use a historical decomposition of output to elicit which variables have contributed to growth 
over time10. Such an analysis by its nature involves a longer sample of data. We use the full sample, 
1980 to 2011, and follow the traditional practice of using the US as a proxy for foreign effects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
10For more on historical decomposition, see for example Buckle et al., (2007) 
Figure 4: Historical Decomposition of Output
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To the authors’ knowledge the only Taiwan specific research examining the importance of 
global conditions is by Chang et al. (2002), who found that from 1985 to 1999 domestic shocks had 
a much larger influence than external shocks on Taiwan. Dungey & Vehbi (2011) note a similar 
trend of domestically sourced growth in other East Asian economies over this period. They note that 
the Asian Financial Crisis tended to initiate increased openness within East Asia, with foreign 
factors displacing domestic factors in driving output growth up until the onset of the global 
financial crisis, when the influence of foreign factors dropped off dramatically. The IMF (2014b) 
find that China played a large offsetting role during this period; with renewed demand for East 
Asian exports helping to prop up East Asian economies in the aftermath of the crisis. 
The historical decomposition for Taiwanese output is shown in Figure 4. The most striking 
feature of the figure is the dramatic shift in the relative importance of domestic and foreign output 
shocks in driving output over the sample. Domestic shocks drove growth from the late 1980s to the 
late 1990s, consistent with the analysis of Chang et al. (2002), but have rapidly declined in 
importance since 1995, such that over the last decade domestic shocks have had a slightly negative 
impact on Taiwanese output. That is, Taiwan has been increasingly reliant on foreign output shocks 
to drive domestic output growth. Indeed Figure 4 shows that other than a slight dip in 1989, foreign 
factors have gradually grown in importance since the beginning of the sample until the earliest 
indications of global financial stress in 2007.  This is in contrast to the sudden rise of the role of 
foreign factors for other East Asian economies reported in Dungey & Vehbi (2011), and indicates 
that Taiwan’s rising openness is associated with a gradual process of liberalization rather than the 
abrupt Asian Financial Crisis induced structural change posited by Zhang et al (2004) for East 
Asian economies in general. 
 Using the US economy as a foreign economy proxy captures the slowing of domestic 
demand as the economy matured, the minimal effect of the AFC and the growing reliance on world 
markets. However, the model does not seem to capture the full extent of this opening to global 
conditions, with the contribution of foreign shocks increasing only marginally from 1997 to 2007. 
This reflects the rise in the contribution of ‘foreign output shocks’ actually only reflecting an 
increase in the contribution of US output shocks. As demonstrated in Section 5.1 the influence of 
Chinese shocks on the Taiwanese economy has grown rapidly in the later parts of the sample. This 
point is made starkly evident in the wake of the global financial crisis with the model only capturing 
the waning recovery of developed economies. In fact, although it experienced a severe blow to 
growth in the early part of the financial crisis in 2007, Taiwan had a strong trade driven recovery, 
with 38 percent export growth and 10.7 percent GDP growth in 2010. That this huge growth surge 
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is not seen in Figure 4 reflects the lack of information about the role of China, where renewed 
export demand propped up the growth of its regional neighbours (IMF, 2014b). This application 
shows the loss of generality resulting from excluding China in the definition of foreign effects for 
East Asian economies. 
5.2.2 Application 2: Monetary Union in East Asia 
A popular application for SVAR studies in East Asia has been assessing the feasibility of monetary 
union. One condition for currency union is that member countries respond similarly to common 
exogenous shocks. Nguyen et al. (2014) and Liu (2012) find that North East Asia’s response to a 
US output shock (proxy for foreign effects) has recently become relatively homogenous. Possibly 
due to the abundance of SVAR literature showing the small impact of China on East Asian 
economies, they use this evidence alone to recommend a North East Asia monetary union. However, 
as discussed in Section 5.1, within East Asia the impact of China is currently likely to be on par 
with that of the US. For this reason, it seems important that the Chinese economy is included in the 
representation of foreign effects. 
 
 
We assess the conclusions made by Nguyen et al. (2014) and Liu (2012) that Taiwan is well 
positioned to enter a North East Asian monetary union. We do this by comparing the impulse 
responses of a number of domestic variables in Taiwan and Singapore - a representative East Asian 
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Figure 5: Impulse Responses of Taiwan and Singapore to a Chinese Output Shock 
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economy - to a Chinese output shock11. If the responses in these two East Asian economies to the 
same Chinese output shock are not similar this will throw doubt on the effectiveness of a monetary 
union involving their currencies. Figure 5 shows the output, inflation and interest responses in 
Taiwan and Singapore to a Chinese output shock. The size of the Chinese output shock itself is 
shown as the top line in the left hand panel of the figure. 
 The far left panel shows that both the initial impact and longer run response of Taiwanese 
output to the Chinese output shock is roughly five times larger than in Singapore. As a result the 
inflation increase is also much larger for Taiwan. Although the monetary response is endogenous to 
the central banks inflation sensitivity, the results imply that the interest rate response to the same 
China originated shock is some ten times greater in magnitude for Taiwan than for Singapore. If 
Taiwan were included in a regional monetary union with Singapore the chosen monetary policy 
stance would not be strong enough to stem Taiwanese inflation. Consequently and in contrast to the 
results of Nguyen et al. (2014) and Liu (2012), this evidence suggests that Taiwan is not well 
positioned to enter an optimal currency area in this region, due to its unique integration with China 
relative to other East Asian economies.  
The example shows that even over a relatively long sample period, the definition of the 
foreign shock will affect conclusions about the nature of integration in the region. A narrow 
definition concentrating on the US economy will provide a misleading picture of Taiwan’s 
susceptibility to foreign shocks. 
These two cases both show that for Taiwan, including the effect of China’s economy is 
imperative for SVAR analysis focused on the past decade or so. The same boom in China-directed 
exports for other East Asian economies, which will likely continue as China’s consumer market 
opens further, imply that this finding will become increasingly true for the entire region. The second 
case illustrated that for policy decisions such as establishing a monetary union, accounting for 
China’s influence is particularly crucial. 
6 Conclusion 
China’s extraordinary 30 plus years of trade-driven economic growth has markedly changed the 
global economic landscape. The IMF writes of the ‘decoupling’ of Emerging Asia from the 
                                                            
11As the SVECM used in this paper is that of Dungey & Vehbi, 2011, a direct comparison can be made 
between Taiwan and Singapore, as its domestic output response was around the mid-range amongst East 
Asian economies. We follow the Dungey & Vehbi (2011) sample: 1986-2009. 
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outcomes of developed economies in light of this rapid growth. Yet surprisingly, the findings of 
many SVAR studies quantifying these spillovers find that China’s influence is still small in the 
region. This is in stark contrast to what is inferred by trade statistics and anecdotal evidence. 
Consequently, many studies continue to pay minimal heed to the effect of China when modeling 
East Asian economies. To examine this contradiction an application was made to Taiwan, the 
economy at the forefront of trade integration with China. It was found that Taiwan’s exposure to 
China is increasing in tandem with the recent exponential rise in cross-strait trade, such that China’s 
influence on Taiwan has been on par with the US from 2000 to 2011. 
 Previous findings of China’s small influence relative to the US were shown to be a 
byproduct of longer sample size. In fixed parameter SVAR models, the historic weight of the US 
and swift rise of China results in an overstatement of the influence of the US relative to China, and 
more generally an understatement of the effects of China on East Asia. Given rapid cross-strait 
trade and the link between trade intensity and shock exposure the revealed effects of China on 
Taiwan is now likely to be substantially larger than the US. Similarly configured East Asian 
economies, such as Malaysia and Korea, are likely to have reached or be facing a similar situation. 
 Given this new bi polar external environment affecting East Asian economies during the 
last decade, we examined the validity of a single source definition of foreign effects. It was found 
that using the US as foreign proxy failed to show the full extent of Taiwan’s reliance on external 
markets, or its export-led growth recovery after the global financial crisis. We also provided 
evidence that previous studies’ advocating that Taiwan enter a North East Asian monetary union are 
likely to be misleading when they do not account for the country’s uniquely large economic 
integration with the Chinese economy. This finding shows the need for further assessment in the 
optimal currency area literature of homogeneity of response to China originated shocks rather than 
just US shocks when assessing the feasibility of monetary union. 
 The key contribution of this paper is to use the rapid growth in exposure between Taiwan 
and China in the 20th century to suggest that models of East Asia take account of this increasingly 
important source of shocks. It is unlikely that the US now provides an appropriate proxy for foreign 
shocks for countries in the region. As the world’s economic centre of gravity continues to rapidly 
swing east, increasingly new modeling frameworks are needed to account for the altering 
configuration of the global economy. 
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ܮ݁ݒ݈݁ݏ  ܥܪܰ	ݕ∗  ܷܵ ݕ∗ ݕ ߨ ݎ  ݍ
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*Lag length is selected based on the AIC, with max lag 4. Variables are in log‐levels except for ݎ, which is expressed as an 
annualised % and ߨ, which is expressed as %ࢤ per annum. Regressions include constant and linear trend; except for ݎand 
ߨ, which just include a constant. The 5% critical value for log‐level variables is ‐3.45, and ‐2.88 for 	ݎand  ߨ. 
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ࢀࢇ࢈࢒ࢋ ૜: ࡸࢇࢍ ࡿࢋ࢒ࢋࢉ࢚࢏࢕࢔ ࡯࢘࢏࢚ࢋ࢘࢏ࢇ
  ܥ݄݅݊ܽ ܷܵ 
ܮܽ݃	ܮ݁݊݃ݐ݄  ܣܫܥ ܵܥ  ܪܳ ܣܫܥ ܵܥ  ܪܳ
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1  െ6.21  െ5.58∗  െ5.96  െ6.00  െ5.36*  െ5.74 
2  െ6.43∗  െ5.43 െ6.02∗ െ6.33*  െ5.33  െ5.92* 
3  െ6.28  െ4.92 െ5.73 െ6.24 െ4.87  െ5.68
4  െ6.16  െ4.43 െ5.45 െ6.11 െ4.39  െ5.41
* Denotes the minimum value of each criteria, which is the designated optimal lag length for that given criteria. 
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Appendix A: Data Descriptions and Sources 
variable Code source
Domestic output y log Taiwan Real GDP, Seasonally Adjusted, constant 
prices, National Currency, Oxford Economics 
(Datastream code: TWXGDSA.D) 
China output CHN ݕ∗ China output as above (Datastream code::CHXGDSA.D)
US output USݕ∗ US output as above (Datastream code::USXGDPR.D 
Treasury bill rate r Taiwan Treasury Bill Rate, % per annum Oxford 
Economics (Datastream code: TWXRCB..R) 
Inflation  CPI, % Change per annum Taiwan Directorate of Budget, 
Accounting & Stats
Real exchange rate q log Taiwan Effective Real Exchange Rate, Not Adjusted, 
National Currency Oxford Economics (Datastream code: 
TWXRXER.F)
Oil price oil Oil Price, yoy% World Oil Price, West Texas 
Intermediate, Oxford Economics (Datastream code: 
WDXWPOWYR)
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Appendix B: Variable Plots 
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Appendix C: Error Correction Term Plot 
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Appendix D: Trade to GDP ratios of East Asia 
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